The District Needs to Hold Itself Accountable in RFK Stadium Deal, Not Just the Team.

Starting in 1937, when George Preston Marshall first brought big-time football to the District, we have been at the forefront of sports and entertainment. During their first season, with Griffith Field as their home base, the team introduced the first fight song and marching band. This coincided with the debut of a new quarterback, Slinging Sammy Baugh, who revolutionized the game and led the team to its first World Championship. By the time the team moved to the DC Stadium, later named RFK in 1961, they had a radio station and were the first to have an entire season of games televised. At the time of their move to their current location in Landover, MD, they also held the longest streak of sellouts in NFL history.

So much of NFL history is linked to the team in Washington and its leadership, both on and off the field. Once again, we have the opportunity to bring our team back to our city, but it must be done correctly. This means that it should be beneficial not only for the league and the team but, more importantly, for the District.

The latest proposal, however, includes changes that, while sounding good on paper, don’t show that the city is open for business. Instead, it sends mixed signals to fans hoping for the team’s return and to future investors. Notably, it involves the requirement of a Project Labor Agreement (PLA), transferring $600 million to improve Metro without consulting the public, and continues to overlook recent failures.

Project Labor Agreements (PLA's) are Ineffective for Reaching Hiring Goals

While many of AOBA's members have regional or national footprints, they all share a strong attachment to the District. This includes a commitment to supporting efforts that ensure District residents work on local projects, receive fair wages, and that projects are built with quality and at the best value. This is how they run their businesses, and they expect the government, which is placing responsibility for funding a significant portion of this project on them, to do the same.

Unfortunately, this body has chosen to use a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) as the method to meet local hiring goals, despite repeated evidence showing they are ineffective. From the Frederick Douglass Bridge to Benjamin Banneker High School, Audi Field, Nationals Stadium, and the Walter A. Washington Convention Center, none of these PLA projects fully met the targets for local hiring or contracting. On the most recent project, the Frederick Douglass Bridge, DC’s Department of Transportation (DDOT) pointed out the failure of the PLA to ensure the hiring of District residents. They not only failed to hire the expected number of District residents but also fell short of the promised apprenticeship hours and the number of apprentices involved in the project. When asked why the numbers were so low, DDOT blamed the PLA entirely.

Additionally, research has shown that using PLAs has contributed to the failure of these projects to meet deadlines and stay within budget. In 2016, CFO Jeffrey S. DeWitt told the Council that requiring PLAs would raise construction costs by over 10%.2 Moreover, in March 2024, CFO Glen Lee cautioned that reviews of various studies and recent DC projects with PLAs indicated cost overruns of at least 10%.3 Given the recent debate about budget pressures and fiscal responsibility, one would expect this council to consider removing this costly requirement, which has repeatedly proven ineffective. 

$600 Million Transfer from the Sports Facility Fund to METRO

One of the main reasons for promoting the use of the 180-acre RFK site was that it is already on the METRO line and has a station designed to support the old stadium. While updating the METRO stop during the site's redevelopment might be necessary, placing the burden on those same businesses without a discussion or dialogue to address concerns and the potential increase in costs could lead to problems. Although we appreciate potential savings by not capitalizing interest for two years, there has still not been a discussion about how this new proposal might impact costs and the long-term plan to pay down the debt. Again, while this may be well-intentioned, this narrative does not send a strong message to investors.

Accountability Goes Both Ways

Finally, a double standard exists regarding accountability. The updated proposal includes accountability measures for missing development thresholds, which is understandable; however, there are no measures to address ineffective practices. To truly show seriousness to potential investors, the government must hold itself and its political partners to the same standards it expects from the team and builders.

Much like budgets, economic development plans are also moral documents. They reflect the city's vision for the future, demonstrate commitment to investment, and inspire residents. Unfortunately, when implemented poorly, they can send negative signals to investors, discourage business owners, and reinforce harmful stereotypes. Now more than ever, it is essential that we once again show business leaders, investors, residents, and international planners that we are serious about our city's future—a future where government agencies collaborate, engage with the local business community, and work to benefit everyone involved.

This project is the catalyst we need right now. But it must be done in a way that sends a clear message: we aren’t just open for business but are working to build a vibrant ecosystem that collaborates effectively. The world is watching, and we must show them that, unlike the folks at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue, DC is serious and focused on ensuring that our city continues to grow properly